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CENTERIOR SERVICE COMPANY v. ACME SCRAP IRON &
METAL CORPORATION: COST RECOVERY OR
CONTRIBUTION IN THE SIXTH CIRCUIT?
I. INTRODUCTION
A recurrent difficulty facing today's courts is the proper appli-
cation of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion and Liability Act (CERCLA),' a law enacted in 1980 by
Congress to address the increasing threat of pollution by providing
for timely and efficient cleanup of hazardous waste. 2 Specifically,
this Note will address whether, under CERCLA, responsible parties
may seek recovery costs from other responsible parties through a
cost recovery action, or are limited to an action for contribution. 3
Courts have been forced to address this issue since the enactment
of the 1986 amendment to CERCLA, the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA). 4
1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1994)) [hereinafter CERCLA].
2. See id. § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607. CERCLA "imposes liability on any person
who arranges for the disposal, treatment or transport of any hazardous substance
which is released, or is threatened to be released, and causes the incurrence of
response costs." Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425, 1428 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
The statute further "requires notification of the existence of dump sites and the
occurrence of releases from them . . . ." Id. at 1428; see New Castle County v.
Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1120-21 (3d Cir. 1997) (imposing strict lia-
bility under section 107(a) for potentially responsible parties regarding hazardous
waste cleanup and other site remediation); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland
Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1500 (11th Cir. 1996) (explaining CERCLA targets na-
tional problem of hazardous waste cleanup); Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd.,
804 F.2d 1454, 1455 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding Congress enacted CERCLA as result
of danger to public and environment due to widespread presence of hazardous
substances).
3. See County Line Inv. Co. v. Tinney, 933 F.2d 1508, 1515 (10th Cir. 1991)
(defining contribution as "a statutory or common law right available to those who
have paid more than their equal share of a common liability"); see also Huggins v.
Graves, 337 F.2d 486, 489 (6th Cir. 1964)(defining nature and scope of
contribution).
4. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9613-9700
(1994)) [hereinafter SARA]. See Centerior Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal
Corp., 153 F.3d 344, 349 (6th Cir. 1998) (acknowledging enactment of SARA re-
sulted in "controversy ... regarding whether PRPs [potentially responsible parties]
who themselves contributed to the contamination of a hazardous waste site could
seek joint and several cost recovery as well as contribution"); Mark A. Stach, Only
Innocent Parties Need Apply: The Death of Private Party Cost Recovery Actions Under
(197)
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SARA explicitly provides a right of contribution for hazardous
waste cleanup in section 113.5 This change in the original legisla-
tion created the current controversy under CERCLA. 6 Parties who
initiated and paid for cleanup continued to seek cost recovery
under CERCLA section 107 from other potentially responsible par-
ties.7 The section 107 cost recovery action imposes strict liability
and simplifies the process of recovery by allowing these parties to
sue one another without concern for the degree of fault, rights
Superfund?, 20 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 33, 36 (1995) (stating that
"[s]ome of the confusion engendered by... [CERCLA] revolves around its provi-
sions for the recovery of costs by private parties who have expended funds to
cleanup sites. Nowhere is this confusion more apparent than in court decisions
dealing with CERCLA's two statutory mechanisms for the recoupment of cleanup
costs"); cf Rumpke, Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co., Inc., 107 F.3d 1235, 1240 (7th
Cir. 1997) (stating decisions regarding these two sections are not clear); United
Tech. Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 33 F.3d 96, 100 (1st Cir. 1994) (assert-
ing problem made more difficult due to courts declining to imply other rights of
action unless expressly directed by Congress); Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889
F.2d 664, 667 (5th Cir. 1989) (noting CERCLA's legislative history is widely recog-
nized as vague, indefinite and, in some respects, contradictory) (citing United
States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902, 905 (D.N.H. 1985)).
5. See CERC[A § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 9613. The additional section provides in
pertinent part:
Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or
potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this title, during or following
any civil action under section 9606 of this title or under section 9607(a)
of this title .... In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate
response costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the
court determines are appropriate.
CERCLA § 113(f) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (1). See S. REP. No. 99-11, at 43 (1985)
(discussing enactment of section 113 which "clarifies and confirms the right of a
person held jointly and severally liable under CERCLA to seek contribution from
other potentially responsible persons, when the person believes that it has assumed
a share of the cleanup or cost that may be greater than its equitable share under
the circumstances"); see also County Line Inv. Co., 933 F.2d at 1516 (explaining Con-
gress addressed these actions by creating express right of contribution under sec-
tion 113); Boeing Co. v. Cascade Corp., 920 F. Supp. 1121, 1132 (D. Or.
1996) (determining that section 113 creates express right of contribution); Sun Co.
v. Browning-Ferris Inc., 124 F.3d 1187, 1190 (10th Cir. 1997) (finding "Congress
codified this implicit right to contribution with the enactment of the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) .... ); H.R. REP. No. 99-
253, pt. 3, at 18-19 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038, 3041 (stating sec-
tion 113 serves to set forth unequivocal statement regarding contribution claims
and judicial review).
6. See Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1298, 1304 (9th
Cir. 1997) (blaming SARA for increased litigation under CERCLA); Adhesives Re-
search Inc. v. American Inks & Coatings Corp., 931 F. Supp. 1231, 1237 (M.D. Pa.
1996) (analyzing new provision of CERCLA, court attributes recent dispute to fail-
ure to reach uniform decision regarding interaction between sections 107 and
113).
7. See, e.g., Control Data Corp. v. S.C.S.C. Corp., 53 F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir.
1995) (examining CERCLA liability under section 107 in suit by party initiating
cleanup); Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425, 1428 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (not-
ing private party engaging in cleanup brought section 107 suit).
2
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which are not available under a section 113 action for
contribution. 8
The addition of the section 113 contribution provision is signif-
icant insofar as it prevents any party responsible for hazardous
waste pollution from recovering, jointly and severally, from other
potentially responsible parties. 9 In fact, a section 113 contribution
action permits only several liability, reduces the statute of limita-
tions by three years, and shifts the burden to the plaintiff to demon-
strate the defendant's equitable share of cleanup costs prior to an
award. 10
In Centerior Service Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp.,11 the
Sixth Circuit restricted the responsible plaintiffs to an action for
contribution under CERCLA section 113.12 With this holding, the
Sixth Circuit joined the majority of sister circuits on the issue.13
The Sixth Circuitjustified its results based on statutory construction
8. See County Line Inv. Co., 933 F.2d at 1515 (explaining fault is consideration
in action for contribution); New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d
1116, 1121 (3d Cir. 1997) (requiring determination of fault in deciding contribu-
tion action). Actions for contribution refer to a claim "by and between joint and
severally liable parties for an appropriate division of the payment one of them has
been compelled to make." Akzo Coatings Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761, 764
(7th Cir. 1994). For the language of CERCIA section 107, see infra note 34 and
accompanying text.
9. See New Castle County, 111 F.3d at 1123. Joint and several recovery under
section 107 would permit "a potentially responsible person found liable under sec-
tion 107 . . . [to] recoup all of its expenditures regardless of fault." Id. at 1121
(emphasis added). Although the court declined to determine which, if any, pri-
vate parties may bring cost recovery actions under section 107, it stated "that a
potentially responsible person under section 107(a), who is not entitled to any of
the defenses enumerated under section 107(b), may not bring a section 107 action
against another potentially responsible person." Id. at 1124; see also United States
v. Colorado & E. R.R. Co., 50 F.3d 1530, 1536 (10th Cir. 1995) (prohibiting poten-
tially responsible person from bringing section 107 action).
10. See Rumpke, 107 F.3d at 1241 (stating statute of limitations for section
107(a) action is six years, while three-year statute of limitations applies to action
for contribution); United States v. Taylor, 909 F. Supp. 355, 361 (M.D.N.C. 1995)
(explaining that contribution action requires PRPs to demonstrate damages are
both divisible and apportionable); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F.
Supp. 162, 229 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (holding liability in action for contribution is only
several, not joint and several).
11. 153 F.3d 344 (6th Cir. 1998).
12. See id. at 356. The Centerior court succinctly concluded "that parties who
themselves are PRPs, potentially liable under CERCLA and compelled to initiate a
hazardous waste site cleanup, may not bring an action for joint and several cost
recovery, but are limited to actions for contribution . . . ." Id.
13. See, e.g., Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1298,
1306 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding responsible parties limited to contribution); Red-
wing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1514 (11th Cir. 1996)
(limiting responsible parties to action for contribution); Control Data Corp. v.
S.C.S.C. Corp., 53 F.3d 930, 935 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding only contribution action
available for responsible parties); United Tech. Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus.,
20001
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and policy.14 Dismissing seemingly contradictory precedent, the
Sixth Circuit concluded that its holding represented a fair result,
consistent with CERCLA's rationale of quick and efficient hazard-
ous waste cleanup.' 5 The Centerior court dismissed the minority
view and precluded responsible parties from bringing section 107
cost recovery actions, thereby eliminating the possibility of simple
and complete reimbursement for cleanup costs. 1 6
This Note will analyze the Sixth Circuit's decision in detail.
Section II presents the factual basis for the Centerior court's deci-
sion. 17 Section III analyzes CERCLA as originally enacted, as well as
the changes resulting from SARA.' 8 Section IV provides an in-
depth examination of the Sixth Circuit's reasoning and Section V
provides a critical discussion of the court's decision. 19 Finally, Sec-
tion VI explains the potential negative impact of the Sixth Circuit's
decision.20
II. FACTS
In Centerior, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ad-
dressed whether a party "who themselves contributed to the con-
tamination of a hazardous waste site could seek joint and several
recovery as well as contribution."2 1 The suit involved plaintiffs
Centerior Service Company, General Electric Company and Ash-
land Oil, Incorporated, and concerned a waste oil reclamation facil-
Inc., 33 F.3d 96, 101 (1st Cir. 1994) (ruling responsible parties can only bring
contribution suit).
14. See Centerior, 153 F.3d 349-57 (utilizing combination of CERC[A analysis
and environmental policy to justify result). For a discussion of the statutory basis
for this construction, see infra notes 59 & 62 and accompanying text. For a discus-
sion of the policy discussion behind the Sixth Circuit's decision, see infra notes
110-13 and accompanying text.
15. See id. at 353 (explaining that "our reading of the statute to preclude
[plaintiffs] from seeking joint and several cost recovery will not impede the goals
of CERCLA"). For the legislative history and purpose of CERCLA as originally
enacted and as amended by SARA, see supra notes 2 & 4 respectively.
16. See id. at 355 (concluding PRPs are limited to actions for contribution
provided by section 113(f)).
17. For the factual basis for the court's decision in Centerior, see infra notes 21-
31 and accompanying text.
18. For an explanation of CERCLA and SARA, see infra notes 32-91 and ac-
companying text.
19. For the rationale and critique of the Sixth Circuit's holding in Centerior,
see infra notes 92-132 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the potential effect of the Sixth Circuit's decision, see
infra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
21. Centerior, 153 F.3d at 347. The Sixth Circuit received the appeal pursuant
to section 1292(b) and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure Five. See id. at 347.
4
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ity and its subsequent cleanup following hazardous waste
pollution.22
The site, in operation for more than forty years, was a dump
site for waste oil used by many parties.23 Ajoint investigation by the
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the
Ohio Environmental Protection Agency uncovered several viola-
tions of federal environmental standards. 24 EPA subsequently is-
sued an administrative order. 25 The order required plaintiffs to
clean the site, and, upon compliance with the order, the plaintiffs
allegedly incurred 9.5 million dollars in costs. 26 In order to recover
the costs not directly attributable to them, plaintiffs filed suit
against more than 125 defendants under CERCLA section 107(a)
to recover, jointly and severally, the costs they incurred during this
cleanup.27
22. See id. Following an investigation, four parties were attributed with re-
sponsibility for the contamination: "(1) Ashland Oil, the current owner/operator
of the site; (2) Huth Oil, a previous owner; (3) Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co.;
and (4) plaintiff General Electric Company." Id. at 346 (footnotes omitted).
Plaintiff Ashland Oil owned the site from 1964 until its purchase by Huth Oil
in 1981. See id. Named party Cleveland is represented in the suit by plaintiff
Centerior Service Company, its parent company. See id. at n.2. Plaintiffs Centerior
Service Company and General Electric Company were adjudged responsible by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) based on its finding that they "had each
arranged for disposal of hazardous substances on the site." Id. at 346.
23. See id. In operation for more than forty years, the site consists of "33 oil
storage tanks with a 992,000 gallon storage capacity." Id. EPA was concerned not
with the parties dumping oil at the site, but those responsible for the poor condi-
tions; the EPA identified four PRPs that played a hand in the poor conditions of
the site: (1) Ashland Oil, the current owner/operator of the site; (2) Huth Oil, a
previous owner; (3) Cleveland Electric Illumniating Co.; and (4) Plaintiff General
Electric Co. Centerior, 153 F.3d at 346 (citations omitted).
24. See id. EPA found that hazardous substance contaminated both the tanks
and surrounding soils, that mandated upkeep was lacking, "that its oil tanks were
corroded, and that unauthorized access to the site was possible through gaps in the
fence surrounding it." Id.
25. See id. EPA is authorized to issue such orders in accordance with 42 U.S.C.
§ 9606(a). Id. The statute authorizes EPA to issue these orders when it finds a site
creates an "imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health or wel-
fare or the environment." CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1994). Admin-
istrative orders are successful primarily due to the penalties they threaten: "If a
party fails to comply with a § 106 order it faces penalties of up to $25,000 per day
and damages in an amount up to three times the cleanup costs." Id. at 346 n.4.
26. See id. at 346. The cleanup required:
securing the site; sampling; developing work-plans; removing, storing,
and disposing of all free standing oil in dikes surrounding the oil storage
tanks; repairing cracked or slumping dikes; dismantling tank equipment;
removing, treating, and disposing all hazardous substances or waste-con-
taminated liquids, soils and sludges; and installing a compacted clay cover
over the cleaned areas.
Id. at 346 n.5.
27. See id. at 346-47.
2000]
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Following consolidation, the District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio determined that all of the claims were necessarily
contribution claims under CERCIA section 113(f).28 Plaintiffs ap-
pealed, contending that potentially responsible parties are not ex-
cluded from section 107(a) recovery because the determination of
whether a party may pursue a section 107 cost recovery action "de-
pends only on whether a party has incurred necessary costs of re-
sponse." 29 Response costs, the plaintiffs further argued, have been
determined to include much more than mere cleanup. 30 The Sixth
Circuit rejected these arguments and affirmed the district court,
holding that parties who themselves contribute to contamination,
the determining factor, are limited to reimbursement through con-
tribution actions governed by CERCLA section 113(f).31
III. BACKGROUND
A. CERCLA
Before analyzing the Sixth Circuit's decision in Centerior, it is
necessary to examine CERCLA and trace its implementation and
impact since its enactment by Congress in 1980. This examination
is especially important to identify methods for cleanup cost reim-
bursement permitted under the statute.
Enacted in response to heightened environmental awareness
and the growing utilization of hazardous substances, CERCLA's pri-
28. See id. The district court faced the issue after defendants filed briefs dis-
puting plaintiffs' standing to pursue an action under section 107(a), contending
"they were limited to bringing contribution claims under CERCLA [section]
113(f), 42 U.S.C. [section] 9613(f)." Id. For the text of relevant portions of sec-
tion 113(f), see supra note 5 and accompanying text.
The district court agreed and "resolved all ten motions by ruling that the
plaintiffs, as PRPs, were limited to bringing a cause of action for contribution
under [section] 113(f) of CERCLA, and that all of the plaintiffs' original com-
plaints pleading joint and several cost-recovery actions under [section] 107(a)
would be construed as asserting a contribution claim under [section] 113(f)." Id.
at 346-47.
29. Centerior, 153 F.3d at 350.
30. See Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761, 762 (7th Cir. 1994).
These response costs may involve much more than simply hauling away contami-
nated substances, as in Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., where plaintiffs sought to
recover costs greater than $1.2 million for: (1) fencing off and otherwise securing
the facility; (2) securing and removing all drums, tanks, and other containers of
hazardous waste from the premises, including buried containers; and (3) deter-
mining the extent to which the soil was contaminated and removing any soil that
was visibly polluted. Id.; see Control Data Corp. v. S.C.S.C. Corp., 53 F.3d 930, 936
(8th Cir. 1995) (finding recoverable response costs include costs incurred in iden-
tifying contaminants and their source).
31. For the Sixth Circuit's analysis, see infra notes 92-114 and accompanying
6
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mary purpose is to provide a means for fast and efficient cleanup of
dangerous pollutants. 32 The statute also insures that the parties re-
sponsible for contamination are those financing the cleanup effort,
either directly or through reimbursement.33 Section 107(a) fur-
thers this goal by awarding the government, and certain private par-
ties, recovery costs incurred during qualified cleanups.3 4
32. SeeNew Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1123 (3d
Cir. 1997) (examining implementation of CERCLA and stating that section 107
cost recovery action was traditionally used by government in efforts to recoup re-
sponse costs); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1500
(11th Cir. 1996) (explaining CERCLA aims to achieve hazardous waste cleanup);
Control Data Corp. v. S.C.S.C. Corp., 53 F.3d 930, 935 (8th Cir. 1995) ("One pri-
mary goal of this private cost-recovery framework [section 107 (a)] is to 'encourage
timely cleanup of hazardous waste sites."') (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Litton
Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1418 (8th Cir. 1990)); see also
Rumpke, Inc. v. Cumming Engine Co., 107 F.3d 1235, 1236 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating
"cleanup will be less likely to occur if potentially responsible parties do not come
forward, yet the often astronomical sums needed to restore these sites can deter
prompt remedial action").
33. See Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 667 (5th Cir. 1989) (em-
phasizing that CERCLA's explicit recovery applies to costs incurred by government
and innocent parties conducting cleanup).
34. See CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). The cost recovery section
provides:
(a) Covered persons; scope; recoverable costs and damages; interest
rate; "comparable maturity" date
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only
to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section -
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous sub-
stance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances
were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged
for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for
disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by
such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration
vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such
hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances
for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or
sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a
threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a
hazardous substance, shall be liable for -
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United
States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the
national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other per-
son consistent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural re-
sources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruc-
tion, or loss resulting from such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried
out under section 9604(i) of this title.
CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). See Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Min-
ing Corp., 118 F.3d 1298, 1300 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting section 9607(a)"authorizes
2000]
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This original provision imposed strictjoint and several liability
on responsible parties. 35 As a result, liability under section 107(a)
is administered without regard to the degree of fault. 36 The rule of
imposing damages without regard to degree of fault, however, is
subject to an exception: liability may be apportioned when the de-
fendant is able to prove that the damages are divisible.37 This bur-
den of proof is sometimes difficult to establish, though, because of
the nature of environmental cleanups and the requirement that the
defendant demonstrate both that the "harm is divisible and that the
damages are capable of some reasonable apportionment. ''38
suits against certain 'statutorily defined "responsible parties" to recover costs in-
curred in cleaning up hazardous waste disposal sites'") (quoting Mardan Corp. v.
C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1455 (9th Cir. 1986)). See, e.g., Walls v. Waste
Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 314 (6th Cir. 1985) (permitting homeowners and
residents near site, innocent parties, to recover because contamination of water
through toxic wastes at nearby landfill threatened their health); United States v.
ASARCO, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 951, 954 (D. Colo. 1993) (involving complaint by
United States to recover cleanup costs incurred in cleanup of Superfund cite in
California); Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425, 1427 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (al-
lowing innocent, adjacent landowners to recover response costs under CERCLA).
35. See New Castle County, 111 F.3d at 1121 (explaining that any successful ac-
tion under CERCLA section 107(a) will hold PRPs jointly and severally liable);
Rumpke, Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co., 107 F.3d 1235, 1240 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating
section 107(a) makes potentially responsible persons subject to joint and several
liability); United States v. Colorado & E. R.R. Co., 50 F.3d 1530, 1535 (10th Cir.
1995) (describing cost recovery actions as imposing strict liability on PRPs for
remediation and other cleanup costs); Farmland Indus. v. Morrison-Quirk Grain,
987 F.2d 1335, 1339 (8th Cir. 1993) (affirming that section 107 holds PRPs strictly
liable for response costs).
36. See Tippins Inc. v. USX Corp., 37 F.3d 87, 92 (3d Cir. 1994) (explaining
CERCLA imposes strict liability, liability apportioned without concern for particu-
lar degree of fault).
37. See United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265, 1280 (3d Cir. 1993).
The Third Circuit conceded that although section 107(a) liability is joint and sev-
eral, liability may be apportioned when the defendant is able to prove the damages
are divisible. See id.
38. New Castle County, 111 F.3d at 1121 n.4. Damages are apportioned "where
there is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause to a
single harm." See id. (citing Rohm &Haas Co., 2 F.3d at 1280); Colorado & E. Rt
Co., 50 F.3d at 1535 (explaining divisibility is necessary "[d]ue to the impossibility
of determining the amount of environmental harm caused by each party where
wastes of varying and unknown degrees of toxicity and migratory potential have
mixed").
The guideline used by most courts is provided in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts: (1) Damages for harm are to be apportioned among two or more causes
where (A) there are distinct harms, or (B) there is a reasonable basis for determin-
ing the contribution of each cause to a single harm. (2) Damages for any other
harm cannot be apportioned among two or more causes. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 433A (1965). See Redwing Carriers, Inc., 94 F.3d at 1513 (utilizing Re-
statement in explaining divisibility of section 107(a) harm under CERCLA); In re
Bell Petroleum Serv., Inc. v. Sequa Corp., 3 F.3d 889, 895 (5th Cir. 1993) (adopt-
ing Restatement approach to section 107(a) divisibility); United States v. Alcan
Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 268-69 (3d Cir. 1992) (same); United States v.
8
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol11/iss1/6
Courts impose CERCLA section 107(a) liability according to a
four-part test that evolved from the language of the statute.39 In
Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc.,40 the Fifth Circuit succinctly stated the
requirements under this test: 1) the site is a "facility" within the
meaning of the Act;4 1 2) a release, or threat of release, of a hazard-
ous substance as defined in the statute occurred;42 3) the plaintiffs
incurred cleanup costs due to this release or threat of release; 43 and
Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 172 (4th Cir. 1988) (same). For a discussion of the
difficulty in determining environmental damages, see infra note 45 and accompa-
nying text.
39. See CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). For the language of this sec-
tion, see supra note 34 and accompanying text.
40. 889 F.2d 664, 668 (5th Cir. 1989). Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc. involved a
CERCLA claim by plaintiff Amoco Oil, Co., the purchaser of property who knew of
the presence of a by-product of fertilizer production, but was unaware of its radio-
activity. See id. at 666. Plaintiff sought to recover the estimated $11-17 million
dollars necessary to clean the site. See id. The Fifth Circuit maintained that once
the four factors test is satisfied, a "plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on the
liability issue." Id. at 668.
41. See id. A facility is "(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment,
pipe or pipeline.... well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage
container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a
hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or other-
wise come to be located .... " CERCLA § 101(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(b). See, e.g.,
New Castle County, 111 F.3d at 1120 (agreeing landfill fits easily within facility);
Pinal Creek Group, 118 F.3d at 1300 (holding water drainage basin contaminated by
mining efforts as facility); United States v. ASARCO, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 951, 954 (D.
Colo. 1993) (finding mining district containing gold, silver, zinc and lead ore
mines, was facility under CERCLA).
42. See Amoco Oil Co., 889 F.2d at 668. A hazardous substance is defined by
CERCLA as "(A) any element, compound, mixture, solution, or substance desig-
nated pursuant to section 9602 of [CERCLA], . . . [and] (E) any hazardous air
pollutant listed under section 112 of the Clean Air Act . . " CERCLA § 101 (14),
42 U.S.C. § 9601(14).
Courts have been reluctant to narrowly define hazardous substance: "[t]he
plain statutory language fails to impose any quantitative requirement on the term
hazardous substance and we decline to imply that any is necessary." Amoco Oil Co.,
889 F.2d at 669. The First Circuit went further, expanding the definition of haz-
ardous substance, to find that radionuclides, the contaminated substance in that
case, were a hazardous substance because "[r]adium-226, the primary radioactive
waste on the property, decays to form a gas, radon-222 . . . considered ra-
dionuclides, which are defined as 'any nuclide that emits radiation.'" Id. at 668
(quoting 40 C.F.R. § 61.91(c) (1988)).
43. See Amoco Oil Co., 889 F.2d at 668. The definition of response costs - the
cleanup costs at issue - is somewhat more difficult, although still contained in the
statutory language:
In [section] 9601(25) 'response' is defined to mean 'remove, removal,
remedy, and remedial action In turn, these terms are further de-
fined in the statute.
Section 9601(23) defines 'remove' or 'removal' to include
the cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from the envi-
ronments, such actions as may be necessary taken in the event of the
threat of release of hazardous substances into the environment, such ac-
tions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or
2000] CEMTNERfOR 205
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4) the defendant to the suit falls within one of the categories of
potentially responsible parties subject to liability under the
statute. 4
4
Once a party meets all four of these requirements, damages are
awarded without concern for the degree of fault, due to the diffi-
culty of determining divisibility of harm.45 In order to recover
costs, a plaintiff must demonstrate that its costs are both necessary
and consistent with the National Contingency Plan, "a set of regula-
tions promulgated by the EPA that establishes procedures and stan-
dards for responding to releases of hazardous substances,
pollutants and contaminants. ' 46 The damages will be awarded un-
threat of release of hazardous substances, the disposal of removed mate-
rial, or the taking of such other actions as may be necessary to prevent,
minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare or to the
environment, which may otherwise result from a release or threat of
release.
Section 9601(24) defines 'remedy' or 'remedial action' to include,
among others, 'those actions consistent with permanent remedy taken
instead of or in addition to removal actions in the event of a release or
threatened release of a hazardous substance into the environment, to
prevent or minimize the release of hazardous substances so that they do
not migrate to cause substantial danger to present or future public health
or welfare or the environment.'
Id. at 670 n.7 (citing CERCLA § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 9601). The Fifth Circuit read
these definitions together finding, "[i] n the absence of any specific direction from
Congress, we believe that the question of whether a release has caused the incur-
rence of response costs should rest upon a factual inquiry into the circumstances
of a case and the relevant factual inquiry should focus on whether the particular
hazard justified any response actions." Id. at 670.
44. See id. at 668. The parties subject to CERCLA liability as potentially re-
sponsible parties are: "(1) present owners or operators of a hazardous waste site,
(2) persons who owned or operated the site at the time when hazardous materials
were disposed of at the site, (3) persons who arranged for the disposal of wastes at
the site, and (4) persons who transported wastes to the site for disposal." CERCLA
§ 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
Courts have utilized the authority to control test to determine PRPs. See, e.g.,
Redwing Carriers, Inc., 94 F.3d at 1504-05 (utilizing "authority to control" test in
determining whether plaintiffs are "operators" of site); Akzo Coatings, Inc. v.
Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding plaintiff PRP because it is
partially liable for site contamination); Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons
Co., 966 F.2d 837, 842 (4th Cir. 1992) (imposing operator liability on party who
had "authority to control" hazardous waste site regardless of whether they exer-
cised "actual control" of site).
45. See United States v. Colorado & E. R.R. Co., 50 F.3d 1530, 1535 (10th Cir.
1995) (concluding divisibility of damages in these environmental circumstances is
difficult because of mixture of various and unknown wastes with undetermined
toxicity and migratory potential); Boeing Co. v. Cascade Corp., 920 F. Supp. 1121,
1121 (D. Or. 1996) (stating, "respective harm to environment caused by parties,
for purposes of cost allocation, was best reflected by mass of contaminants which
each party contributed to contamination plume").
46. New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1120 n.2 (3d
Cir. 1997). Plaintiffs must satisfy a two-part test for necessary costs that must com-
port with EPA regulations. See Boeing Co., 920 F. Supp. at 1132. The test "required
10
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less the defendant proves the existence of a defense sufficient to
exonerate the defendant under the statute.47
The original legislation did not provide for contribution ac-
tions, however, which rendered individual potentially responsible
parties liable for the full amount of cleanup costs, with no method
of distributing damages among all responsible parties. 48 The Tenth
by 42 U.S.C. 9605 and finally promulgated on July 16, 1982, appears at 47 Fed.
Reg. 31180, 31202 (1982) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300).... [and] adds noth-
ing to the statutory definitions [of response costs]." Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F.
Supp. 1425, 1429 (S.D. Ohio 1984). Thus, the response costs have been inter-
preted by courts from the statute:
The phrase 'response costs' is nowhere defined in the Act, and the word
'response' is defined only as 'remove, removal, remedy and remedial ac-
tion.' 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25). Subsection (23) of this section defines 're-
move' and 'removal' to include actions necessary to clean up or remove
hazardous substances, to monitor, assess, and evaluate a release, to dis-
pose of removed material, or to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to
the public or the environment. Specific examples given include security
fencing, alternative water supplies, temporary evacuation and housing,
and other emergency assistance. Subsection (24) defines 'remedy' and
'remedial action' as actions consistent with a permanent remedy to pre-
vent or minimize the release of hazardous substances. Specific examples
given include containment actions, treatment or incineration, provision
of alternate water supplies, and any monitoring reasonably required to
assure that the actions taken protect the public and the environment.
Id.
For a discussion of the meaning of response costs under CERCLA, see supra
note 43 and accompanying text.
47. See Colorado & E. R.tK Co., 50 F.3d at 1535 (explaining damages awarded
unless available defense is proven sufficiently). The defenses available to a poten-
tially responsible party are limited, and explicitly stated in the statute:
There shall be no liability under sub section (a) of this section for a per-
son otherwise liable who can establish . . . the damages resulting there-
from were caused solely by -
(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war;
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or
agent of the defendant ....
(4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs.
CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). See also Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland
Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1507 (lth Cir. 1996) (explaining first two defenses
rarely used, but third-party defense usually raised).
The statute provides that the defendant must establish, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that:
(a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance con-
cerned, taking into consideration the characteristics of such hazardous
substance, in light of all relevant facts and circumstances, and (b) he took
precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party
and the consequences that could foreseeably result from such acts or
omissions ....
CERCLA § 107(b) (3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (3).
48. See Colorado & E. R.R. Co., 50 F.3d at 1535. The Tenth Circuit described
the problem, under the original CERCLA legislation, which limited section 107(a)
cost recovery actions to the government and innocent parties incurring cleanup:
2000]
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Circuit noted this inequity in United States v. Colorado & Eastern Rail-
road Co.,49 and responded by developing an implied right of contri-
bution under CERCLA.50 As described in Jones v. Inmont Corp.,51
courts interpreted the "any other person" language of CERCLA sec-
tion 107 to imply a right to contribution. 52 This judicially-created
"CERCLA, as originally enacted, left a PRP faced with the prospect of being sin-
gled out as the defendant in a cost-recovery action without any apparent means of
fairly apportioning CERCLA costs awarded against it to other PRPs." Id.
In Colorado & Eastern Railroad Co., EPA filed suit against four parties seeking
response costs incurred in cleanup of a Chemical Superfund Site. See id. at 1533.
Two of the defendants entered into a partial consent decree to finance and per-
form all cleanup. See id. A third defendant entered into a separate agreement,
then all four defendants filed claims against one another for section 9607(a) cost
recovery or section 9613(f) contribution. See id. at 1533-36. The Tenth Circuit
limited the claim to one for contribution, finding, "claims between PRPs to appor-
tion costs between themselves are contribution claims pursuant to § 113 regardless
of how they are pled." Id. at 1539. Cf Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d
664, 667 (5th Cir. 1989) (suggesting CERCLA as enacted was "'last-minute com-
promise' between three competing bills . . . [and therefore] 'acquired a well-de-
served notoriety for vaguely-drafted provisions and an indefinite, if not
contradictory, legislative history."') (quoting United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp.
898, 902, 905 (D.N.H. 1985)); Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 318
(6th Cir. 1985) (acknowledging CERCLA legislative history particularly unhelpful
and vague). For a discussion of the confusion caused by the last minute enactment
of SARA, see infra note 63 and accompanying text.
49. 50 F.3d 1530 (10th Cir. 1995).
50. See Colorado & E. R.R. Co., 50 F.3d at 1535. See County Line Inv. Co. v.
Tinney, 933 F.2d 1508, 1516 (10th Cir. 1991) (explaining courts implied right to
contribution under CERCLA due to inequity problem without right to contribu-
tion); Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1457 n.3 (9th Cir. 1986)
(recognizing inequality if no contribution available); United States v. New Castle
County, 642 F. Supp. 1258, 1268-69 (D. Del. 1986) (finding justice requires right to
contribution); Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1491-92 (D. Colo.
1985) (implying federal right to CERCLA contribution).
51. 584 F. Supp. 1425 (S.D. Ohio 1984). Jones involved an action by landown-
ers near an illegal dump site. See id. at 1427. Plaintiffs' complaint charged defend-
ants with "intentionally concealing the nature of their activities from the
authorities and the owner of the farm, of using unsafe and improper methods of
disposing of both solid and liquid hazardous wastes, and of failing to warn the
farm's owner and his neighbors of the future hazard posed by the illegal dump-
ing." Id. On reviewing a motion for summary judgment for defendant, the court
held that "plaintiffs' complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action under section
9607 of CERCLA for liability for response costs and under section 6973 of RCRA
for abatement of an imminent hazard." Id. at 1437.
52. See Jones, 584 F. Supp. at 1428 (explaining language "any other person"
creates implied right to contribution). Although Jones was a suit by private land-
owners, not at all responsible for contamination by adjacent property, the court
allowed their suit for declarative and injunctive relief. See id. at 1426, 1428; see also
United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397, 416 (D.N.J. 1991) (finding "[s]ection
107 permits the Government or a private party to go in, clean up the mess, pay the
bill, then collect all its costs not inconsistent with the NCP [National Contingency
Plan] from other responsible parties . . ."); City of Philadelphia v. Stephan Chem.
Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1142 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (holding "any other person" also in-
cludes party itself liable under CERCLA).
12
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action for contribution was applicable in situations where poten-
tially responsible parties were subject to joint and several liability
and "incurred response costs in excess of their pro rata share." 53
B. SARA
In 1986, Congress codified this right to contribution in SARA,
which provides an express right to contribution for potentially re-
sponsible parties following a civil action under section 107(a) .54
The right to contribution changed in four significant ways with the
section 113 express provision, which potentially responsible parties
opposed.55
Most importantly, SARA limited the liability of defendants to
several, as opposed to joint and several. 56 This change makes the
process of reimbursement more difficult and expensive. 57 Contri-
53. Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1298, 1404 (9th
Cir. 1997). The rationale for this right is to "alleviate the potentially unfair burden
that joint and several liability may cause." Id.
54. SeeCERCLA § 113(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f). For the language of the statute
as amended, see supra note 5. See also United States v. Akzo Coatings, Inc., 949
F.2d 1409, 1417 (6th Cir. 1991) (explaining legislative purpose of SARA was "to
better define cleanup standards, to expand resources available to EPA for investi-
gations and cleanups, to clarify EPA's authority under Superfund law, and to ex-
pand and clarify the states' role in any remedial action undertaken, or ordered, by
EPA").
55. See, e.g., New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116,
1123 (3d Cir. 1997) (rejecting plaintiffs' argument that PRPs can choose between
section 107 and 113). For a discussion of the controversy which arose as a result of
SARA, see supra notes 4 & 6 and accompanying text.
56. See Sun Co. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 124 F.3d 1187, 1191 (10th Cir. 1997)
("[section] 113 contribution action is not a 'cost-recovery' action under [section]
107 as that action has been defined, because it does not impose strict, joint and
several liability on the defendant PRPs . . . [and] is governed by the equitable
apportionment principles established in [section] 113(f).").
Furthermore, section 113(f) does not add to recovery or "in itself create any
new liabilities; rather it confirms the right of a potentially responsible person
under section 107 to obtain contribution from other potentially responsible per-
sons." New Castle County, 111 F.3d at 1122 (quoting Bancamerica Commercial
Corp. v. Mosher Steel, Inc., 100 F.3d 792, 800 (10th Cir. 1996)).
For a discussion of the distinction between a section 107(a) action, joint and
several liability, and contribution, see supra notes 3 & 8 and accompanying text.
57. See County Line Inv. Co. v. Tinney, 933 F.2d 1508, 1515 (10th Cir. 1991)
(explaining that "[c]ontribution is a statutory or common law right available to
those who have paid more than their equitable share of a common liability"); Hug-
gins v. Graves, 337 F.2d 486, 489 (6th Cir. 1964) (stating contribution is fundamen-
tally different than joint and several liability because it is based on "a common
obligation ... and one party shall not be subject to bear more than his just share to
the advantage of his co-obligor").
According to some courts, the limitations on an action for contribution are
consistent with CERCLA goals:
If . .. a potentially responsible person found liable under section 107
could bring a section 107 action against another potentially responsible
2000]
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bution is fundamentally different than joint and several liability be-
cause it is based on "a common obligation . . . and one party shall
not be subject to bear more than his just share to the advantage of
his co-obligor."58
SARA also reduces the statute of limitations for contribution
claims from six to three years.59 This change is significant because
CERCLA, when originally enacted, did not provide a statute of limi-
tations for section 107(a) actions. 60 In addition, the contribution
person . . . [it] could recoup all of its expenditures regardless of fault.
This strains logic. '[I]t is sensible to assume that Congress intended only
innocent parties - not parties who were themselves liable-to be permit-
ted to recoup the whole of their expenditures.'
New Castle County, 111 F.3d at 1121 (quoting United Tech. Corp. v. Browning-Ferris
Indus., Inc., 33 F.3d 96, 100 (1st Cir. 1994)).
58. Huggins, 337 F.2d at 489; see Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining
Corp., 118 F.3d 1298, 1301 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding, with respect to contribution,
that plaintiff is liable only for its share of contamination and can hold other PRPs
liable based on their share of contamination); Akzo Coatings Inc. v. Aigner Corp.,
30 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 1994) (defining contribution as claim "by and between
jointly and severally liable parties for an appropriate division of the payment one
of them has been compelled to make"); New Castle County, 111 F.3d at 1122 n.6 (3d
Cir. 1997) (recognizing that only defense to joint and several liability is section 113
contribution); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1513
(11th Cir. 1996) (permitting parties proceeding under section 113 to allocate
liability).
59. See United Tech. Corp., 33 F.3d at 98. The court explained that "cost recov-
ery actions are subject to a six-year statute of limitations ... while contribution
actions must be brought within half that time." Id.
In United Technical Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., the First Circuit held
that this difference fits within the legislative goals of CERCLA:
[T]he two statutes of limitations complement each other and together
exhaust the types of actions that might be brought to recoup response
costs: the shorter prescriptive period, contained in 42 U.S.C.
§ 9 613(g) (3), governs actions brought by liable parties during or follow-
ing a civil action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606-9607(a), while the longer stat-
ute of limitations, contained in 42 U.S.C. § 9 6 13(g) (2), addresses actions
brought by innocent parties that have undertaken cleanups (say, the fed-
eral, state or local government).
Id. at 99.
The statutes of limitations for both reimbursement actions are set forth in
section 113. See id. The statute provides:
(2) Actions for recovery of costs
An initial action for recovery of the costs referred to in section 9607
of this title must be commenced- . . .
(B) for a remedial action, within 6 years after initiation of physical
on-site construction ....
(3) Contribution
No action for contribution for any response costs or damages may be
commenced more than 3 years after-
(A) the date of judgment ...
(B) the date of an administrative order ....
CERCLA § l13(g), 42 U.S.C. § 9 6 13 (g).
60. See Velsicol Chem. Corp. v. Enenco, Inc., 9 F.3d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 1993)
(recognizing section 113(f) established statutes of limitations for both reimburse-
14
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provision shifts the burden of demonstrating defendants' liability to
the plaintiff.61 Furthermore, the provision contains a settlement
provision prohibiting potentially responsible party suits for contri-
bution against those who settle with the government.62
Enacted to clarify recovery by potentially responsible parties,
the new section 113 (f) operated in reality to generate great confu-
sion regarding the rights and limitations of responsible parties. 63
In addressing this issue, the District Court for the District of Ore-
gon pointed out in Boeing Co. v. Cascade Corp., 64 that a section 113
action does not eliminate prior case law because the courts require
the defendant to satisfy the four part test determining liability
under section 107(a) as a prerequisite to bringing a contribution
action. 65
ment actions under CERCLA because original CERCLA did not provide section
107(a) statute of limitations).
61. See United States v. Taylor, 909 F. Supp. 355, 365 (M.D.N.C. 1995) (ex-
plaining that in contribution action PRP has burden of establishing liability).
62. See CERCLA § 113(f) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (2). The statute provides:
(2) Settlement
A person who has resolved its liability to the United States or a State in an
administrative or judicially approved settlement shall not be liable for
claims for contribution regarding matters addressed in the settlement.
Such settlement does not discharge any of the other potentially liable
persons unless its terms so provide, but it reduces the potential liability of
the others by the amount of the settlement.
Id.; see also United States v. Colorado & E. R.R. Co., 50 F.3d 1530, 1537 (10th Cir.
1995) (noting that "PRP who has entered into a judicially approved settlement
with the United States may not be held liable for contribution to another PRP if
the contribution claim concerns matters addressed in the settlement").
63. See Ann Alexander, Standing Under Superfund §§ 107 and 113; Avoiding the
Error of the Blind Man and the Elephant, Toxics L. RrR. (BNA) 155 (July 12,
1995) (noting SARA "ignited a firestorm" of confusion).
64. 920 F. Supp. 1121 (D. Or. 1996).
65. See Boeing Co., 920 F. Supp. at 1132. The district court determined PRP
liability of a defendant company in a suit for contribution by a contributing PRP.
See id. at 1142. The Boeing Co. court ultimately determined:
(1) defendant was responsible for pro rata share of response costs in-
curred by plaintiff; (2) plaintiff adequately accounted for costs incurred
for response actions to satisfy requirements of National Contingency Plan
(NCP); (3) plaintiff adequately provided information and adequately in-
vestigated contamination to satisfy NCP; (4) respective harm to environ-
ment caused by parties, for purposes of cost allocation, was best reflected
by mass of contaminants which each party contributed to contamination
plume; (5) revision of mass analysis allocation so as to allocate greater
responsibility to plaintiff was appropriate in light of contaminant flow
analysis; (6) funds received by plaintiff through settlement with previous
owners and operators of site had to be factored into allocation of re-
sponse costs; and (7) plaintiff was entitled to declaratory judgment allo-
cating responsibility for future costs, which would be same as that for past
costs.
Id. at 1121.
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Once a plaintiff successfully establishes the liability of a defend-
ant, the court will allocate a portion of the response costs.6 6 That
is, once a defendant is found liable under section 107(a), the court
moves to allocation, "a contribution claim controlled by 42 U.S.C.
[section] 9613(f)." 67 In making this determination, courts will con-
sider all facts relevant to determining equitable distribution of
costs. 68 Many courts utilize the "Gore factors;" these factors pur-
port to exemplify the purpose and determination of equitable
allocation. 69
The rationale for this demonstration of liability is provided in the statute:
"[a]ny person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or poten-
tially liable under section 9607(a) .... " CERCLA § 113(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f).
66. See Control Data Corp. v. S.C.S.C. Corp., 53 F.3d 930, 935 (8th Cir. 1995).
The Eighth Circuit determined that "[o]nce liability is established, the focus shifts
to allocation. Here, the question is, what portion of the plaintiffs response costs
will the defendant be responsible for?" Id.
As the Third Circuit has explained, allocation is effective in reaching the goal
of SARA: "while a potentially responsible person should not be permitted to re-
cover all of its costs from another potentially responsible person, the person
should be able to recoup that portion of its expenditures which exceeds its fair
share of the overall liability." New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111
F.3d 1116, 1122 (3d Cir. 1997). Furthermore, allocation is equitable, requiring a
court to "make its own factual findings and legal conclusions." Control Data Corp.
v. S.C.S.C. Corp., 53 F.3d 930, 935, 938 (8th Cir. 1995) (explaining party will be
allocated share of response costs depending on its demonstration of harm, includ-
ing amount and toxicity); see, e.g., Boeing Co., 920 F. Supp. at 1142 (utilizing alloca-
tion to find parties liable based on 30/70 percent basis).
Allocation, however, is fundamentally different from divisibility:
While the "divisibility" defense to joint and several liability is frequently
invoked in cost recovery actions brought under § 107(a), it is not a de-
fense to a contribution action under § 113(0. In contrast to a § 107(a)
action, a contribution claim under § 113(f) is a means of equitably allo-
cating response costs among responsible or potentially responsible
parties.
Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1513 (l1th Cir.
1996).
67. Control Data Corp., 53 F.3d at 935.
68. See id. Courts consider various factors in determining the proper alloca-
tion of costs in contribution claims. See id. Courts are not limited in what factors
they utilize, because "[i] n any given case, 'a court may consider several factors, a
few factors, or only one determining factor, . . . depending on the totality of the
circumstances presented to the court."' United States v. Colorado & E. R.R. Co.,
50 F.3d 1530, 1536 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting Environmental Transp. Sys., Inc. v.
ENSCO, Inc., 969 F.2d 503, 509 (7th Cir. 1992)).
69. See Boeing, 920 F. Supp. at 1132. The Gore factors, named for a sponsor of
CERCLA are:
1) the ability of the parties to demonstrate that their contribution to a
discharge, release, or disposal of a hazardous waste can be distinguished;
2) the amount of hazardous waste involved; 3) the degree of toxicity of
the hazardous waste; 4) the degree of involvement by the parties in the
generation, transportation, treatment, storage, or disposal of the hazard-
ous waste; 5) the degree of care exercised by the parties with respect to
the hazardous waste concerned, taking into account the characteristics of
[Vol. XI: p. 197
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In addition, as a result of the changes to the right of contribu-
tion through section 113, potentially responsible parties continue
to bring suit under section 107(a), forcing courts to interpret the
correct reimbursement process under as amended CERCLA.70 Po-
tentially responsible parties argue that section 107(a)'s language
does not exclude joint and several recovery by responsible parties
because the language provides an avenue for cost recovery "by any
other party," and does not specify innocent parties. 71 A majority of
courts addressing the issue explicitly reject this argument, maintain-
ing that "any claim that would reapportion costs between these par-
ties is the quintessential claim for contribution. '" 72 In addition to
such hazardous waste; and 6) the degree of cooperation by the parties
with Federal, state or local officials to prevent any harm to the public
health or the environment.
Id. (quoting H.R. RP. No. 99-253, pt. 3, at 20 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 3042); see John Copeland Nagle, CERCLA, Causation and Re-
sponsibility, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1493, 1522-23, n.135 (1994) (stating Gore factors most
widely utilized factors by courts).
70. See Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1496
(11th Cir. 1996) (noting potentially responsible party brought suit against other
responsible parties under both section 107(a) and section 113(f)); Pinal Creek
Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1298, 1301 (9th Cir. 1997) (discussing
suit brought under sections 107(a) and 113(f); Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner
Corp., 30 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 1994) (analyzing suit brought under sections
107(a) and 113(f)); Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 668, 672-73 (5th
Cir. 1989) (dismissing suit for contribution when brought under both sections
107(a) and 113(f)).
71. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). The First Circuit describes the
argument that many PRPs utilize in an attempt to bring suit under section 107(a),
thereby eliminating the unfavorable consequences of a section 113(f) action:
"[a]ppellants argue that, notwithstanding section 9613(f)(3), the broad, unquali-
fied language to the effect that responsible parties shall be liable to 'any other
person,' 42 U.S.C. [section] 9607(a)(4), provides an alternative avenue for the
maintenances of their suit." United Tech. Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 33
F.3d 96, 101 (1st Cir. 1994). In other words, "section 107 states that responsible
parties shall be liable to 'any other person' . . . [and] the court should not limit
section 107 'person[s]' to innocent parties." New Castle County v. Halliburton
NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1122 (3d Cir. 1997). The Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit rejected this argument. See id. at 1123.
This argument has been rejected by many courts, including the Third Circuit
in New Castle County, which found that allowing a PRP to choose between the two
provisions "would render section 113 a nullity. Potentially responsible persons
would quickly abandon section 113 in favor of the substantially more generous
provisions of section 107." Id. at 1123; see also Colorado & E. R.R. Co., 50 F.3d at
1536 (supporting conclusion similar to Third Circuit, limiting PRP to section 113
contribution action); United Tech. Corp., 33 F.3d at 101 (holding PRP choice be-
tween sections 107(a) and 113(f) is inconsistent with CERCLA goals).
72. Colorado & E. R.IX Co., 50 F.3d at 1536; see Pinal Creek Group, 118 F.3d at
1301 (finding PRPs limited to contribution claim under flush language of section
107); New Castle County, 111 F.3d at 1126 (concluding CERCLA cost recovery ac-
tion may only be brought by innocent parties that have undertaken clean-ups);
Boeing Co. v. Cascade Corp., 920 F. Supp. 1121, 1141 (D. Or. 1996) (limiting cost
recovery availability to innocent parties); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apart-
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the statutory construction arguments, these courts find this conclu-
sion to be consistent with CERCLA's goals. 73
Other courts, however, have permitted potentially responsible
parties to pursue section 107 cost recovery actions.74 The rationale
for this minority position is that cost recovery actions expedite CER-
ments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1514 (llth Cir. 1996) (finding PRP precluded from pursuing
cost recovery action); United Tech. Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 33 F.3d
96, 106 (1st Cir. 1994) (relegating PRP to contribution, finding cost recovery avail-
able only to innocent party); Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761, 773-
74 (7th Cir. 1994) (preventing PRP from recovery under section 107(a)).
73. See Colorado &E. RIR. Co., 50 F.3d at 1536 (prohibiting responsible parties
from seeking recovery under section 107(a) and recognizing that if PRP plaintiff
was "allowed to recover expenditures incurred in cleanup and remediation from
other PRPs under § 107's strict liability scheme, [section] 113(f) would be ren-
dered meaningless"); Pinal Creek Group, 118 F.3d at 1304 (limiting PRP liability to
contribution, court rejected argument "that the policy of promoting rapid volun-
tary cleanups would be undermined to any significant degree .... [C]ourts may
take into account the degree of cooperation shown by a PRP when equitably allo-
caring liability among PRPs under [section] 113(f) (1)"). For a discussion of the
policy and rationale of CERCLA, see supra note 2 and accompanying text.
74. See Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 840 (4th
Cir. 1992) (allowing potentially responsible owner of contaminated property to
recover under section 107 for cleanup costs); Richland-Lexington Airport Dist. v.
Atlas Properties, Inc., 901 F.3d 1206, 1207 (4th Cir. 1990) (permitting potentially
liable waste disposal operator to proceed under section 107); Town of Wallkill v.
Tesa Tape Inc., 891 F. Supp. 955, 957, 961 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (concluding town, lia-
ble under CERCLA due to municipal landfill, may proceed under section 107(a)
following further factual determination of liability); Companies for Fair Allocation
v. Axil Corp., 853 F. Supp. 575, 577 (D. Conn. 1994) (allowing PRP to pursue
section 107 cost recovery action); United States v. SCA Serv., Inc., 865 F. Supp.
533, 543 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (finding PRP not limited to section 113(f) action for
contribution); City of N. Miami v. Berger, 828 F. Supp. 401, 404 (E.D. Va. 1993)
(allowing PRP to proceed under either section 107(a) or 113(f)); Chesapeake &
Potomac Tel. Co. v. Peck Iron & Metal Co., 814 F. Supp. 1269, 1271 (E.D. Va.
1992) (rejecting majority, permits PRP recovery under cost recovery provision);
FMC Corp. v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 786 F. Supp. 471, 487 (E.D. Pa.
1992) (declining to limit PRPs to action for contribution); United States v.
Jagiella, No. 87 C 1406, 1991 WL 78171, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 2, 1991) (allowing PRP
to pursue section 107 cost recovery action); Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 790 F.
Supp. 710, 719 (W.D. Mich. 1990) (finding majority rule, forcing PRP to pursue
section 113(f) contribution suit, inconsistent with CERC[A); Sand Springs Home
v. Interplastic Corp., 670 F. Supp. 913, 916 (N.D. Okl. 1987) (permitting PRP to
choose action under either cost recovery or contribution provisions); see also Ad-
hesives Research Inc. v. American Inks & Coatings Corp., 931 F. Supp. 1231, 1232
(M.D. Pa. 1996) (permitting PRP who had already settled with EPA to pursue cost
recovery under section 107).
The District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania follows the minority
view, while noting the similarities in the cases and difficulty in justifying the two
different holdings:
The facts of the aforementioned cases are not significantly different from
those of cases where a minority of courts have reached opposite results.
The contradictory outcomes appear to derive more from two differing
interpretations of CERCLA, its policy goals, and the proper means of ef-
fectuating those goals, than from factual distinctions in the cases ....
[T]he court finds the position taken by the minority of courts to address
18
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CLA's goals by encouraging quick cleanup.75 In United States v. Tay-
lor,7 6 the District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina
took a slightly different approach: "the test as to whether a private
party may utilize Section 107 does not rest on whether that party is
liable, or potentially liable. Rather, it depends on whether such
party has incurred 'necessary costs of response.'"V Thus, accord-
ing to the minority approach, as long as a plaintiff has sufficiently
incurred response costs, it may pursue a section 107 cost recovery
action.
78
The relative silence of the Supreme Court further contributes
to the confusion regarding the proper interpretation of CERCLA;
the Court's only opinion regarding these provisions, Key Tronic
Corp. v. United States,79 addressed the narrow issue of whether re-
sponse costs as defined in the statute may include attorneys fees,
and did not provide lower courts with a definite resolution on the
the issue to comport with the plain language of CERCLA, and to best
serve the policy goals of the statute.
Id. at 1241. Ultimately, the Adhesives Research court based its decision on the lack of
the word innocent in section 107(a), finding "that the 'any other person' language
in [section] 107 means 'any other person' regardless of that person's CERCLA
culpability." Id. at 1246.
75. See Bethlehem Iron Works, Inc. v. Lewis Indus., Inc., No. Civ. A. 94-0752,
1996 WL 557592, at *225 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 1, 1996) (explaining quick and efficient
remedy of hazardous pollution chief goal of CERCLA); see also Adhesives Research,
931 F. Supp. at 1246 (holding that "[s]uch an interpretation and application of
CERCLA merely assists in accomplishing CERCLA's goals by providing all parties
with a strong incentive to put the environment first").
76. 909 F. Supp. 355 (M.D.N.C. 1995). Taylor involved claims by a third-party
against co-defendants after the original claim against co-defendants was dismissed.
See id. The CERCLA claims involved the "environmental cleanup [by the United
States] of a Super Fund site known as the 'Aberdeen Pesticide Site.'" Id. at 357.
77. Taylor, 909 F. Supp. at 362-63 (citing CERCLA § 107(a) (4) (B), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607 (a) (4) (B)) (footnotes omitted). The District Court for the Middle District
of North Carolina found the approach of limiting potentially responsible parties to
actions for contribution fundamentally flawed:
First, it ignores the plain language of the statute. Second, this construc-
tion requires that the courts engraft the word 'innocent' into Section
107(a) (4) (B), so as to permit other 'innocent' parties to recoup their
recovery costs. However, this would require a party to prove its inno-
cence before utilizing Section 107, an extraordinary burden to place on a
plaintiff.
Id. at 363; see also United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397, 414 (D.N.J. 1991)
(supporting Taylor position by pointing out that since government may be PRP,
under majority approach it would be prohibited from bringing section 107 action,
a contrary conclusion).
78. See Taylor, 909 F. Supp. at 363. Response costs are slightly different under
this approach, though, as "a party does not incur response costs merely by being
adjudged liable, or by being a defendant in a cost-recovery action. Rather, a party
must, in some degree, actually conduct the cleanup." Id. For a discussion of re-
sponse costs, see supra note 43 and accompanying text.
79. 511 U.S. 809 (1994).
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availability of cost recovery actions for potentially responsible par-
ties.80 The failure of the Supreme Court to directly address this
issue has created confusion in lower courts. 81
Although the Supreme Court did not specifically address
whether a potentially responsible party may pursue a section 107(a)
cost recovery action, the language of the Court can, and has, been
interpreted in this manner.82 The Key Tronic court reiterated three
important principles which, taken together, may imply the right of
potentially responsible parties to pursue section 107(a) cost recov-
ery actions.83
80. See id. The precise issue addressed in Key Tronic, 511 U.S. was "whether
attorneys fees are 'necessary costs of response' within the meaning of [section]
107(a) (4) (B) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act of 1980(CERCLA), as amended by the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) . . . and therefore recoverable in such an
action." Id. at 811 (citation omitted). The Court held that "CERCLA [section]
107 does not provide for the award of private litigants' attorney's fees associated
with bringing a cost recovery action." Id. at 809. Key Tronic involved the contami-
nation of a water supply by disposal of hazardous liquids by Key Tronic and various
other parties, including the United States Air Force. See id. Specifically, plaintiffs
sought attorneys fees incurred in litigating the action. See id.
81. See id. The confusion from this decision stems from two of the Court's
conclusions. First, the Supreme Court stated that CERCLA "now expressly autho-
rizes a cause of action for contribution in [section] 113 and impliedly authorizes a
similar and somewhat overlapping remedy in [section] 107." Id. at 816. Second,
the Court stated that "some lawyers' work that is closely tied to the actual cleanup
may constitute a necessary cost of response in and of itself under the terms of
[section] 107(a) (4) (B). The component of Key Tronic's claim that covers the
work performed in identifying other PRP's fall in this category." Id. at 820.
See, e.g., Adhesives Research Inc. v. American Inks & Coatings Corp., 931 F.
Supp. 1231, 1246 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (stating its decision to permit cost recovery ac-
tions by PRPs is consistent with Key Tronic, noting, however, this support is limited
because Key Tronic Court did not directly address section 107 standing). But see
Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1298, 1303 (9th Cir. 1997)
(finding decision to limit PRP actions to contribution consistent with Key Tronic
because Supreme Court implied "that claim by a PRP under [section] 107 would
be 'for contribution against those treated as joint tortfeasors.'") (quoting Key
Tronic, 511 U.S. at 818 n.11).
82. See Key Tronic, 511 U.S. at 816, 818, 820.
83. See id. at 816. In resolving the issue of recovering attorneys fees under
CERCLA, the Supreme Court began with an examination of the legislation as orig-
inally enacted and the effect of SARA. See id. For a discussion of the legislative
history of CERCLA and SARA, see supra notes 2 & 4 & 5 and accompanying text.
The Court found sections 107 and 113 overlapping because, from its reading
of the statute, section 113 did not negate the judicially implied right to seek retri-
bution under section 107:
Other SARA provisions, moreover, appeared to endorse the judicial deci-
sions recognizing a cause of action under § 107 by presupposing that
such an action existed. An amendment to § 107 itself, for example, refers
to 'amounts recoverable in an action under this section.' 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607 (a) (4) (D). The new contribution section also contains a refer-
ence to a 'civil action .. .under section 107(a).' 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (1).
Thus the statute now expressly authorizes a cause of action for contribu-
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First, the Court interpreted the SARA amended statute to "ex-
pressly authorize[ ] a cause of action for contribution in [section]
113 and impliedly authorize[ ] a similar and somewhat overlapping remedy
in [section] 107."8 4 Second, and most important, the decision stated
that implied actions under section 107 are not prohibited by section 113
and, therefore, continue to exist: section 107 "impliedly authorizes
private parties to recover cleanup costs from other potentially re-
sponsible parties. '8 5 Third, the Supreme Court reversed the deci-
sion of the appellate court, in part, to exclude the award of
attorneys fees for prosecution, permitting the plaintiff, a responsi-
ble party, to recover other costs under section 107.86
To limit responsible parties to section 113(f) contribution
claims, courts have attempted to distinguish Key Tronic.8 7 Other
courts facing the issue have omitted any discussion of Key Tronic,
avoiding the difficulty of maintaining the majority opinion in light
of the Supreme Court's holding.8 8
tion in § 113 and impliedly authorizes a similar and somewhat overlap-
ping remedy in § 107.
Id. at 816.
Most importantly, the Supreme Court held that section 113 did not negate the
judicially implied right to seek retribution under section 107. See id. at 818.
84. Id. at 818; see Centerior, 153 F.3d at 350 (finding section 107(a) actions
available to innocent parties incurring response costs); Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584
F. Supp. 1425, 1428 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (allowing innocent adjacent property owners
to proceed against landfill owners under section 107(a)); Walls v. Waste Resource
Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 318 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding section 107(a) available for in-
nocent parties).
85. Key Tronic, 511 U.S. at 818 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs sought attorneys
fees for: "(1) the identification of other potentially responsible parties (PRPs)....
(2) preparation and negotiation of its agreement with the EPA; and (3) the prose-
cution of this litigation." Id. at 812. The Supreme Court limited plaintiffs' recov-
ery to the second, finding:
These efforts might well be performed by engineers, chemists, private in-
vestigators or other professionals who are not lawyers .... Tracking down
other responsible solvent polluters increases the probability that a
cleanup will be effective and get paid for. Key Tronic is therefore quite
right to claim that such efforts significantly benefited [sic] the entire
cleanup effort and served a statutory purpose apart from the reallocation
of costs. These kind of activities are recoverable costs of response clearly
distinguishable from litigation expenses.
Id. at 820.
86. Id. at 818; see also Adhesives Research Inc. v. American Inks & Coatings
Corp., 931 F. Supp. 1231, 1238 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (finding "any person who incurs
response costs, regardless of that person's potential or actual liability" may recover
under section 107(a)).
87. See, e.g., Sun Co. v. Browning-Ferris Inc., 124 F.3d 1187, 1193 (10th Cir.
1997) (utilizing Key Tronic only to establish rights of recovery, but no attempt to
distinguish holding).
88. See, e.g., New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116,
1119 (3d Cir. 1997) (declining to discuss Key Tronic); Boeing Co. v. Cascade Corp.,
2000]
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Thus, the Sixth Circuit was bound by the Key Tronic precedent,
as well as its earlier decision in Velsicol Chemical Corp. v. Enerco, Inc.89
The issue presented in Velsicol was whether SARA statute of limita-
tions should be applied retroactively.90 This decision did not specif-
ically address whether a potentially responsible party may pursue a
section 107 cost recovery claim, but in maintaining that the statute
of limitations does not apply retroactively, the Sixth Circuit in Vel-
sicol instructed the district court to reinstate a cost recovery claim by
a potentially responsible party.91
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
In Centerior Service Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp., the Sixth
Circuit examined the proper interpretation of CERCLA.92 The
Centerior court discussed a fundamental issue on appeal: whether
the district court properly found that plaintiffs' action for reim-
bursement of hazardous waste cleanup costs necessarily constitutes
an action for contribution under the statute. 93 The Sixth Circuit
920 F. Supp. 1121, 1125 (D. Or. 1996) (limiting responsible party to section 113(f)
claim, omitting any reference to Key Tronic).
89. 9 F.3d 524 (6th Cir. 1994).
90. See id. at 527. The Sixth Circuit permitted cost recovery and contribution
claims by a potentially responsible city and chemical corporation, finding the "stat-
ute of limitations for a response cost recovery claim under CERCLA [section] 107,
enacted as part of SARA in 1986, should [not] be retroactively applied to an ac-
crued-but-not-yet filed claim . I..." d. at 526.
91. See id. at 529-30. The Sixth Circuit stated that "absent a specific congres-
sional intent to the contrary, we will broadly interpret the CERCLA provisions in
accordance with CERCLA's statutory goals of facilitating expeditious cleanups of
inactive and abandoned hazardous waste sites and holding the responsible parties
liable for the cleanups." Id. at 529. Moreover, while not directly addressing suit
availability, the Velsicol court stated, "Velsicol [PRP] had, at the very least, three years
from the effective date of statute of limitations... tofile its cost-recovery claim." Id. at
529-30 (emphasis added).
92. See Centerior Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp., 153 F.3d 344,
346 (6th Cir. 1998). For the holdings of courts of appeals addressing the same
issue, see supra note 13.
93. See id. at 347. The district court maintained that all PRPs' reimbursement
claims are necessarily for contribution, and "all of the plaintiffs' original com-
plaints pleading joint and several cost recovery actions under [section] 107(a)
would be construed as asserting a contribution claim under [section] 113(f)." Id.
On appeal, the defendants supported this conclusion, emphasizing the need to
read CERCLA's reimbursement provisions together: "[since section] 113(f) is in-
corporated under [section] 107, [and] then a [section] 113(f) action is an action
to recover the necessary costs of response by any other person, as referred to in
[section] 107. The action only happens to be an action for contribution." Id. at
350.
The plaintiffs refuted this conclusion, advocating a test whereby "joint and
several cost recovery under CERCLA does not rest on whether a party is liable or
potentially liable, but rather depends only on whether a party has incurred neces-
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answered in the affirmative, concluding that a potentially responsi-
ble party under CERCLA is necessarily limited to an action for
contribution. 94
The Sixth Circuit began its discussion with an examination of
the statute itself, as well as the statute's history.95 The Centerior
court noted at the outset that many courts have considered this is-
sue since the 1986 enactment of SARA.96 Then, in order to fully
understand the significance of the change in legislation, the Sixth
Circuit defined contribution. 97 Recognizing that plaintiffs' suit fits
within the meaning of an action for contribution, the Centerior
court concluded, without discussion, that plaintiffs are necessarily
limited to a section 113 (f) action and are precluded from asserting
a section 107 (a) cost recovery action which would provide joint and
several liability.98
sary costs of response." Id. at 349-50; see United States v. Taylor, 909 F. Supp. 355,
362-63 (M.D.N.C. 1995) (utilizing minority position in determining PRP liability).
94. See Centerior, 153 F.3d at 355 (limiting PRPs to action for contribution).
95. See id. at 345-47. For the text of the applicable sections of CERCLA, see
supra notes 5 & 34 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the rationale for
CERCLA's enactment, see supra notes 2 & 4 and accompanying text.
96. See id. at 349. For a discussion of the 1986 enactment of SARA, see supra
notes 54-91 and accompanying text.
97. See id. at 350-51. The Sixth Circuit recognized that adequate resolution of
this issue required an interpretation of the legislation as amended by SARA, be-
cause "[w]hether [a] party may seek joint and several cost recovery, or is limited to
an action for contribution governed by [section] 113(f), however, depends on the
nature of the cause of action pleaded." Id. at 350. Relying on Black's Law Diction-
ary, the Sixth Circuit defined "contribution as 'the [r]ight of one who has dis-
charged a common liability to recover of another also liable, the aliquot portion
which he ought to pay or bear.'" Id. (quoting BLACK's LAw DIcTIONARY 328 (6th
ed. 1990)); see also United Tech. Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 33 F.3d 96,
99 (1st Cir. 1994). The First Circuit defined contribution in an environmental
context, holding that it "refers to an action by a responsible party to recover from
another responsible party that portion of its costs that are in excess of its pro rata
share of the aggregate response costs including both first-instance costs and reim-
bursed costs." Id. at 103.
98. See Centerior, 153 F.3d at 351, 356. The facts of this case - that plaintiffs: 1)
are PRPs; 2) have no defenses available under § 107(b); 3) received an administra-
tive order to commence cleanup; and 4) incurred more costs than liable for -
indicate a fundamental claim for contribution. See id.
In Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., the Seventh Circuit examined similar fac-
tors: "Akzo itself is a party liable in some measure for the contamination at the
Fisher-Calo site, and the gist of Akzo's claim is that the costs it has incurred should
be apportioned equitably amongst itself and the others responsible . . . That is a
quintessential claim for contribution." 30 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 1994). Akzo Coat-
ings, Inc. involved an action for contribution for costs incurred by plaintiff "for the
initial clean-up work it had performed at the behest of the EPA as well as the
voluntary costs it had incurred in studying the long term clean-up of the site with
other PRPs." Id. at 763. In limiting the potentially responsible plaintiff to contri-
bution, the Seventh Circuit utilized the Restatement and the Fifth Circuit's deci-
sion in Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., to hold that plaintiff's claim "remains one by
2000] 219
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The Sixth Circuit next responded to the plaintiffs' contention
that they are not limited to an action for contribution because they
are distinguishable from plaintiffs in similar cases. 99 Plaintiffs dis-
tinguished their case based on two factors: first, they have not en-
tered into a settlement or been adjudged liable by EPA;100 and
second, an action for contribution requires a prior adjudication of
liability. 10 1
Beginning its determination of whether plaintiffs must be ad-
judged liable before instituting an action for contribution, the
Centerior court examined its previous references to contribution,
concluding that "none of the definitions set forth above referred to
any such requirement."10 2 Instead, the Sixth Circuit requires only
and between jointly and severally liable parties for an appropriate division of the
payment one of them has been compelled to make." Akzo Coatings, Inc., 30 F.3d at
764 (citing Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 672 (5th Cir. 1989)). For
the Fifth Circuit's holding and rationale, see supra notes 40 & 70 and accompany-
ing text. For the text of the relevant RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965)
provision, section 433A, see supra note 38 and accompanying text.
99. See Centerior, 153 F.3d at 351.
100. See id. (charging no adjudication, thus cost recovery action available); see,
e.g., New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1119-20 (3d Cir.
1997) (holding previous action by EPA limits PRPs to contribution); United States
v. Colorado & E. R.R. Co., 50 F.3d 1530, 1533 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding PRP may
not pursue cost recovery action following EPA adjudication); United Tech. Corp., 33
F.3d at 97 (limiting PRPs to contribution action after plaintiffs had previously been
sued by EPA in district court, resulting in consent decree directing remedial
action).
101. See Centerior, 153 F.3d at 351. Plaintiffs "contend that contribution exists
only when a party has either been 'adjudged' liable or settled a common liability."
Id.
102. Id. Following its previous references, the Sixth Circuit stated that an ac-
tion for contribution exists when "a plaintiff act[s] under some compulsion or
legal obligation to an injured party when he or she discharged the payment." Id.
The Sixth Circuit examined Huggins v. Graves, an earlier Sixth Circuit case involv-
ing a right to contribution at common law in a medical malpractice suit, which
specifically concluded:
Although the legal obligation on the part of each obligor must actually
exist... [i]f ajudgment has not been rendered, the validity of the claim
against both of the parties can be determined by the Court in the action
seeking contribution. The basic question is whether the parties are actu-
ally legally obligated, not whether obligation has been reduced to a
judgment.
Huggins v. Graves, 337 F.2d 486, 489 (6th Cir. 1964).
Other courts have followed the Huggins view, finding a prior judgment of lia-
bility is unnecessary. See Zontelli Bros. v. Northern P. Ry. Corp., 263 F.2d 194, 199
(8th Cir. 1959) (determining contribution action may proceed, regardless of prior
adjudication); Chamberlain v. McCleary, 217 F. Supp. 591, 597 (E.D. Tenn. 1963)
(holding prior judgment not necessary); McLochlin v. Miller, 217 N.E.2d 50, 53
(Ind. Ct. App. 1966) (finding court may determine legal obligation without prior
judgment).
24
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that the plaintiff have acted out of a legal or moral duty.10 3 Fur-
thermore, the Sixth Circuit pointed out that the statute provides
explicitly for a contribution action following an administrative or-
der which indicates no formal adjudication is necessary. 104
The Sixth Circuit supported this conclusion through an exami-
nation of the legislative history of CERCLA, finding that reading
sections 107(a) and 113(f) together is fully consistent with CER-
CLA's goals. 10 5 The fact that SARA was enacted to clarify the right
to an action for contribution, which was previously judicially im-
plied, indicates that a "right to contribution has always been estab-
lished pursuant to [section] 107, yet only after the codification of
[section] 113(f) was the right made explicit."'1 6 The Centerior
court, therefore, reasoned that the explicit provision does not add
further requirements. 10 7 The Sixth Circuit found that decisions
103. See Centerior, 153 F.3d at 351 (noting adjudication unnecessary so long as
plaintiff "act[s] under some compulsion or legal obligation to an injured party").
104. See id. The Sixth Circuit explained section 106 administrative orders:
The EPA issues a [section] 106 order when it finds an "imminent and
substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or environ-
ment" due to site contamination .... If a party fails to comply with a
[section] 106 order it faces penalties of up to $25,000 per day and dam-
ages in an amount up to three times the cleanup costs.
Id. at 346 n.4 (citation omitted) (quoting CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a)).
For cases utilizing CERCLA administrative orders and an explanation of their ra-
tionale, see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
105. See id. at 352. The Sixth Circuit believed this legislative history supported
its position by requiring that "[section] 113(f) and [section] 107 work together."
Id. The Centerior district court found that reading these provisions together is con-
sistent with the purpose of CERCLA:
Congress's intent [is] that Superfund sites be cleaned up expeditiously
and fairly. Section 113(f) (2) has been aptly described as creating a carrot
and stick. 'The carrot the EPA can offer potential settlors is that they
need no longer fear that a later contribution action by a non-settlor will
compel them to pay still more money to extinguish their liability .... As
for the stick, if the settlor pays less than its proportionate share of liabil-
ity, the non-settlors, being jointly and severally liable, must make good
the difference.'
United States v. ASARCO, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 951, 956-57 (D. Colo. 1993) (quoting
In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 712 F. Supp. 1019, 1027 (D. Mass.
1989)). For a discussion of SARA's legislative history, see supra note 4.
106. Centerior, 153 F.3d at 352. In an attempt to support this conclusion, the
Sixth Circuit pointed to language in the legislative history of SARA, which "empha-
sized that the provision 'clarifies and confirms the right of a person held jointly
and severally liable under CERCLA to seek contribution from other potentially
liable parties.'" Id. at 352 (quoting S. REP. No. 99-11, at 44 (1985)); see ASARCO,
Inc., 814 F. Supp. at 956 (reading two provisions of CERCLA together such that
"[u]nder CERCLA's scheme, section 107 governs liability, while section 113(f) cre-
ates a mechanism for apportioning that liability among responsible parties").
107. Centerior, 153 F.3d at 352. The Sixth Circuit pointed to the language
finding "[section] 113(f) did not create a new cause of action, nor did it create
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from the Ninth and Tenth Circuits supported its position.10 8 The
Sixth Circuit also found this conclusion consistent with its previous
holdings and the Supreme Court decisions regarding CERCLA fol-
lowing the enactment of SARA. 10 9
The Centerior court maintained that forcing the plaintiffs to
pursue the more limited, costly action for contribution is not only
fully consistent with CERCLA's goals, but is actually the remedy
under plaintiffs' desired system. 01 Although section 107(a) cost re-
new liability .. " Id. (citing Sun Co. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 124 F.3d 1187, 1191
(10th Cir. 1997)).
108. See Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1298, 1306
(9th Cir. 1997) (prohibiting potentially responsible party from recovering under
section 107); Sun Co., 124 F.3d at 1189 (finding potentially responsible party lim-
ited to section 113 action for contribution).
Pinal Creek Group involved a suit by three mining companies "engaged in vol-
untary cleanup of hazardous waste site . . . against other potentially responsible
parties ... asserting claim for totality of its cleanup costs and seeking imposition of
joint and several liability." Pinal Creek Group, 118 F.3d at 1306. The Ninth Circuit
refused to permit section 107(a) action by a PRP because "a PRP does not have a
claim for the recovery of the totality of its cleanup costs against other PRPs, and a
PRP cannot assert a claim against other PRPs for joint and several liability." Id. at
1306.
The similar language in Pinal Creek Group stated, "while [section] 107 created
the right of contribution, the 'machinery' of [section] 113 governs and regulates
such actions, providing the details and explicit recognition that were missing from
the text of [section] 107." Id. at 1302.
The plaintiffs in Sun Co. were virtually in the same position as the plaintiffs in
Centerior- PRPs incurring costs pursuant to a section 106 administrative order. See
Sun Co., 124 F.3d at 1189.
109. See Centerior, 153 F.3d at 355. The Sixth Circuit distinguished its prior
decision in Velsicol Chemical Co. v. Enerco, Inc., which permitted a PRP to pursue a
section 107(a) cost recovery action. See id. (citing Velsicol Chem. Co. v. Enerco,
Inc., 9 F.3d 524 (6th Cir. 1994)). The prior decision is distinguishable from Center-
ior, according to the Centerior court, because in Velsicol, the Sixth Circuit "was not
confronted with, nor did it address the issue presently before this court. More-
over, the case involved plaintiffs who apparently had initially joined forces with the
EPA and state and local government authorities to plan the site cleanup without
governmental prodding." Id. (citing Velsicol, 9 F.3d at 528).
The Sixth Circuit also dismissed any conflict with the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Key Tronic. See Centerior, 153 F.3d at 356. The Sixth Circuit isolated one
phrase used in the Supreme Court's opinion: "the Court's statement that the 'stat-
ute now expressly authorizes a cause of action for contribution [section] 113 and
impliedly authorizes a similar and somewhat overlapping remedy in [section]
107.'" Id. (citing Key Tronic, 511 U.S. at 816).
For a detailed discussion of the facts and holding of Velsico, see supra notes 90
& 91 and accompanying text. For the facts, holding and rationale of Key Tronic, see
supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
110. See Centerior, 153 F.3d at 353. The Sixth Circuit found that even if plain-
tiffs were allowed to pursue a section 107(a) cost recovery action, contribution
would ultimately be necessary because it would force the defendants to these ac-
tions to file contribution claims against original PRPs. See id. at 354. According to
the Centerior court, plaintiffs' argument is fundamentally flawed because they seek
to prolong contribution through unnecessary litigation and expense. See id.; see
also Rumpke, Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co., 107 F.3d 1235, 1238 (7th Cir. 1997)
26
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol11/iss1/6
covery actions exist to protect those parties not responsible for con-
tamination incurring the high cost of their cleanup, plaintiffs, in
this case, are not these innocent parties.11' As the Sixth Circuit ex-
plained, "[c]ontrary to the rosy picture painted by the plaintiffs,
they did not come forward in an effort to initiate a site cleanup, but
were forced to do so under the compulsion of a [section] 106(a)
order facing stiff penalties and fines." 112 Additionally, all incentives
to conduct cleanups are not eliminated by this decision, according
to the Centerior court, because in determining the allocation under
section 113(f), "[o]ne of the equitable factors a court may consider
is the degree of cooperation of the parties with the government."'1 3
The Sixth Circuit, thus,joined a majority of circuit courts of appeals
in holding that a potentially responsible party under CERCLA is
necessarily limited to an action for contribution under section
113(f). t 14
V. CRITIcAL ANALYSIS
The Sixth Circuit incorrectly held that a potentially responsible
party is limited to an action for contribution under CERCLA when
seeking reimbursement for hazardous waste cleanup exceeding its
(reaching same conclusion as Centerior by proposing 107(a) still available to party
directly injured and not attempting to apportion costs); New Castle County v. Hal-
liburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1123 (3d Cir. 1997) (contending although
PRP prohibited from 107(a) cost recovery action, innocent parties may still seek
section 107 recovery).
111. See Centerior, 153 F.3d at 354. The three plaintiffs are Centerior Service
Co., General Electric Co., and Ashland Oil, Inc. See id. at 344. They either owned
and operated the contaminated facility contributing to the damage and threat to
the environment or utilized the facility to dispose of substances contributing to this
contamination. See id. For a discussion of the contamination and cleanup require-
ments, see supra notes 23, 24 & 26 and accompanying text.
112. Id. at 354. Following an in-depth investigation, EPA issued an adminis-
trative order in accordance with CERCLA section 106 on October 5, 1990. See id.
at 344. For a discussion of the basis of authority for administrative orders, see
supra note 25 and accompanying text.
113. Id. at 354; see also Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d
1298 (9th Cir. 1997) (limiting PRPs to section 113(f) contribution actions). The
plaintiffs in Pinal Creek Group contended that the holding, limiting PRPs to action
for contribution, "would hamper CERCLA's policy of promoting rapid and volun-
tary environmental responses by private parties to the threat posed by hazardous
waste sites." Id. at 1304. The Pinal Creek Group court did not find this argument
persuasive because "other incentives exist for PRPs to conduct clean up operations
promptly . . . [a PRP will] protect its on-going operations and be better able to
control its cleanup costs, then if it waited for the government to intervene." Id. at
1305.
114. Centerior, 153 F.3d at 355. For other jurisdictions limiting responsible
parties to an action for contribution, see supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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rightful share.1 15 The difficulty with this decision, and similar cir-
cuit court decisions, is that they fail to adequately distinguish the
narrow holding of the Supreme Court in Key Tronic Corp. v. United
States.116 Furthermore, these decisions ignore the alternative CER-
CLA policy goals advanced by permitting certain potentially respon-
sible parties to pursue section 107(a) cost recovery actions."1 7
The great disparity in procedure and recovery requires an in-
depth analysis consistent with the purposes of the statute. 118
115. See id. (explaining PRPs must pursue action for contribution and are pre-
cluded from joint and several cost recovery).
116. For the facts and holding of the Supreme Court in Key Tronic, see supra
notes 80-86 and accompanying text. In Centerior, the Sixth Circuit addressed Key
Tronic in a footnote, finding it distinguishable:
Nor do we find the Supreme Court's decision in Key Tronic Corp. v.
United States, . . . where the Court held that attorney's fees were not
necessary costs of response covered under [section] 107(a), but permit-
ted private litigants to maintain cost recovery actions under the section,
preclusive here. The Supreme Court in Key Tronic was not directly con-
fronted with the issue of whether PRPs may seek cost recovery. Further,
the Court's statement that the 'statute now expressly authorizes a cause of
action for contribution in [section] 113 and impliedly authorizes a simi-
lar and somewhat overlapping remedy in [section] 107,' . . . actually sup-
ports our reading of the statute.
Centerior, 153 F.3d at 355 n.14 (citing Key Tronic, 511 U.S. at 816) (citations omit-
ted); see Pinal Creek Group, 118 F.3d at 1303 (finding limiting PRPs to contribution
action consistent with Key Tronic). But see Adhesives Research Inc. v. American Inks
& Coatings, Corp., 931 F. Supp. 1231, 1246 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (finding Key Tronic
Court seems to "implicitly endorse the validity of a PRP cost-recovery action").
117. See Centerior, 153 F.3d at 354 (holding PRPs limited to contribution is
consistent with CERCLA goal because there are additional incentives for cleanup
and government cooperation available under section 113(f)); United States v.
ASARCO, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 951, 957 (D. Colo. 1993) (stating that "[t]he possibil-
ity of disproportionate liability created by CERCLA 'promotes early settlements,
and deters litigation for litigation's sake, and is an integral part of the statutory
plan"') (quoting United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 92 (1st Cir.
1990)).
Conversely, in Adhesives Research, Inc. v. American Inks & Coatings Corp., the
Middle District of Pennsylvania adopted the minority view that permitting some
PRP section 107(a) cost recovery actions is fully consistent with CERCLA:
Under [section] 107 'potentially responsible plaintiffs who initiate an en-
vironmental cleanup may sue for cost recovery and initially shift the cost
of cleanup to other PRPs. Where plaintiffs are also liable parties, how-
ever, defendants may assert counterclaims pursuant to Section 113(f), en-
suring that plaintiffs do not escape from paying an equitable share of the
cleanup costs.' The court noted that this 'two-step framework' effectuates
CERCLA's goals by providing incentives for private parties to promptly
initiate cleanup, while simultaneously ensuring that costs will eventually
be allocated in an equitable manner.
Adhesives Research Inc., 931 F. Supp. at 1244 (quoting Pinal Creek Group v.
Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1298, 1407 (9th Cir. 1997)) (citations omitted).
For a discussion of the policy goals of CERCLA as originally enacted and with
the SARA Amendment, see supra notes 2 & 4 and accompanying text.
118. For the legislative purpose of CERCLA, see supra note 2 and accompany-
ing text.
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C--ATE-ROR
Although the Sixth Circuit supported its decision with both legisla-
tive history and precedent, its attempts to distinguish its prior deci-
sion in Velsicol Chemical Corp. v. Enerco, Inc.119 and the Supreme
Court's decision in Key Tronic Corp. v. United States,120 were
unsuccessful.
A. Velsicol Chemical Corp. v. Enerco, Inc.
In its earlier decision, the Sixth Circuit examined whether
SARA statute of limitations should be applied retroactive-
ly.121 The Velsicol holding established a conclusion contrary to that
of Centerior, because the effect of the Velsicol decision was to rein-
state a section 107 cost recovery action brought by a potentially re-
sponsible party. The Sixth Circuit distinguished Velsicol in Centerior,
based on two grounds: 1) the earlier decision did not address the
specific issue of Centerior, but rather, statute of limitations applica-
tion; and 2)its earlier decision "more closely parallels the question
we do not address here [in Centerior], whether a plaintiff potentially
responsible party who voluntarily initiates a cleanup may neverthe-
119. 9 F.3d 524 (6th Cir. 1993). For a discussion of the Sixth Circuit's hold-
ing and rationale in Velsicol, see supra notes 90 & 91 and accompanying text. To
distinguish the Velsicol decision, the Sixth Circuit pointed out that plaintiffs' de-
sired CERCLA procedure in Centerior inhibits CERCLA:
Such equitable allocation would ultimately result from the plaintiffs' sce-
nario. They tout a 'two step framework' in which PRPs who initiate
cleanup may seek joint and several recovery from other PRPs who then
may turn around and file contribution claims against the original PRPs.
Thus, even under the plaintiffs' framework, contribution ultimately be-
comes the necessary result. They seek, however, to prolong this result
through unnecessary litigation, time and expense.
Centerior, 153 F.3d at 354. The Ninth Circuit supports this rationale, finding "the
policy of promoting rapid voluntary cleanups would [not] be undermined to any
significant degree .... other incentives exist for PRPs to conduct cleanup opera-
tions promptly." Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1298,
1304-05 (9th Cir. 1997).
Courts supporting the minority position, that PRPs may pursue section 107(a)
cost recovery actions, find the Centerior court's rationale inconsistent with the pol-
icy of CERCLA:
[CERCLA's] plain meaning is consistent with effectuating the broad re-
medial goals of CERCLA by encouraging parties to promptly and volunta-
rily initiate cleanup or settlement .... In permitting PRPs to pursue cost
recovery actions, the court provides PRPs who initiate cleanup or settle-
ment with two valuable procedural tools - the longer 6-year statute of
limitations, and the shifting of the burden of proof as to divisibility of
harm to the defendant PRPs. Contrary to what some would argue, the
court does not thereby provide plaintiff PRPs with a windfall.
Adhesives Research Inc. v. American Inks & Coatings Corp., 931 F. Supp. 1231,
1246 (M.D. Pa. 1996).
120. 511 U.S. 809 (1994).
121. For the facts, holding and rationale of the Sixth Circuit in Velsicol, see
supra notes 90 & 91 and accompanying text.
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less bring a joint and several cost recovery action."122  These
grounds are insufficient to distinguish Velsicol, and the Sixth Circuit
would have been better served by acknowledging that its prior hold-
ing is no longer valid, thereby setting forth a consistent statement
regarding potentially responsible party CERCLA reimbursement. 123
The first basis for distinguishing Velsicol, that it addressed only
statute of limitations application, may be eliminated by a thorough
reading of the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Velsicol.1 24 The decision
prohibited the six-year statute of limitations from applying to a
claim's accrual prior to the 1986 enactment of SARA. 125 The im-
port of the Sixth Circuit's language in Velsicol, regarding the appli-
cation of the six-year statute of limitations, defeats its attempt to
distinguish the court's acquiescence to the cost recovery action by a
potentially responsible party, which is even more apparent in its re-
jection of the application of the doctrine of laches to a section
107(a) cost recovery action. 126 This broad holding, read together
with the lack of adjudication requirement and language of section
107(a), fails to adequately distinguish its earlier opinion.
122. Centerior, 153 F.3d at 355.
123. Velsico, 9 F.3d at 527.
124. See id. at 529. For the statutes of limitations provided by CERCIA, see
supra notes 10, 59 & 60 and accompanying text.
125. See id. Although the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that its previous hold-
ing pertains to section 107(a), it refuted that the decision held a section 107(a)
action available to a PRP. See Centerior, 153 F.3d at 355. The unpersuasive illusion
to a different issue is overshadowed by its statement of the holding: "the court rein-
stated the cost-recovery claim brought by Velsicol, which was itself a PRP." Id. (emphasis
added). The Sixth Circuit also considered the defenses available in a section
107(a) cost recovery action indicating its understanding of the action being pur-
sued by Velsicol. See id.
126. See Velsicol, 9 F.3d at 530. The analogy of Velsicol to a voluntary PRP
cleanup is similarly illusory. The Centerior court pointed out that in the Velsicol
case, "EPA was not forced to bring any civil action against the plaintiffs and did not
have to issue an administrative order to compel the plaintiffs to initiate cleanup."
Centerior, 153 F.3d at 355. This rationale is insufficient, as the holding in Centerioris
broadly applied to "parties who themselves are PRPs, potentially liable under CER-
CIA and compelled to initiate a hazardous waste cleanup .... " Id. at 356. This is
further supported by the language of the Centerior court's decision itself, stating
that "[s] ection 113(f) expressly authorizes the court to allocate response costs be-
tween the parties using any equitable factors the court deems appropriate ....
One of the equitable factors a court may consider is the degree of cooperation of
the parties with the government." Id. at 354. For a discussion of the equitable
factors utilized by courts in apportioning response costs, see supra note 69 and
accompanying text; see also Sun Co. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 124 F.3d 1187, 1191
(10th Cir. 1997) (refraining from determining issue of innocent parties' rights
under section 107(a)); Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d
1298, 1300 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding PRP voluntarily engaged in cleanup limited to
113(f) contribution action).
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CENTERfOR
Second, categorizing the plaintiffs in Velsicol as cooperative par-
ties and, thereby distinguishing them from the plaintiffs in Centerior,
also fails because the degree of cooperation is merely one of the
equitable factors to be considered by a court in determining a re-
sponsible party's share of the costs after deciding the appropriate
remedial action. 127 Cooperation does not render a party innocent
and, therefore, does not resolve the issue of whether an innocent
party, a party not at all responsible for the hazardous condition,
may pursue a section 107(a) cost recovery action. 128
B. Key Tronic Corp. v. United States
Key Tronic represents the only opinion by the Supreme Court
regarding cleanup cost reimbursement under CERCLA as amended
by SARA.' 29 Although not directly confronting the availability of
cost recovery claims, the Supreme Court expressly classified certain
costs as recoverable by potentially responsible parties under section
107(a).130 By pointing only to the first principle established by the
Supreme Court in Key Tronic, that there may be an implied right to
contribution under section 107, courts, like the Centerior court, dis-
tort the rule and fail to facilitate an accurate reflection of the
Supreme Court's interpretation of CERCA. 131 A minority of
courts support the opinion that potentially responsible parties may
continue to pursue section 107(a) cost recovery actions notwith-
standing SARA and, thus, correctly read the three principles of Key
Tronic.132
127. See Centerior, 153 F.3d at 350 (stating that "[c]ost recovery actions by par-
ties not responsible for site contaminations are joint and several cost recovery ac-
tions governed exclusively by § 107(a)... [but] [c]laims by PRPs .. .seeking costs
from other PRPs are necessarily actions for contribution, and are therefore gov-
erned by the mechanisms set forth in [section] 113(f)"); see also Redwing Carriers,
Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1496 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding section
107(a) claim available only to parties not responsible for contamination of relevant
site). For a discussion of the factors a court may consider and the widely-utilized
Gore factors, see supra note 69 and accompanying text.
128. See Centerior, 153 F.3d at 355-56 (noting court never addressed specific
issue of whether joint and several cost recovery action available for PRP voluntarily
initiating cleanup).
129. Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 810 (1994). For the
facts and holding of the Court, see supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
130. See id. at 820 (finding plaintiff PRP "Key Tronic's claim that covers the
work performed in identifying other PRP's falls in this category .... [and] may
constitute a necessary cost of response in and of itself under the terms of [section]
107(a) (4) (B)").
131. For the Sixth Circuit's analysis of the Supreme Court's ruling in Key
Tronic, see supra note 116 and accompanying text.
132. See, e.g., Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1489,
1503 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding the only PRP section 107 claim is one "for contribu-
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VI. IMPACT
The Sixth Circuit's decision in Centerior is significant insofar as
it increases the majority of circuits limiting potentially responsible
party recovery to section 113(f) contribution actions. 133 The deci-
sion purports to limit section 107(a) to its alleged original purpose
of providing a simple and complete method for non-responsible
parties to recover their costs for cleanup of contaminated sites.' 34
The holding may have very little impact within the Sixth Circuit,
however, since it fails to overrule Velsicol.13 5 Thus, courts may, and
should, limit the holding to its particular fact situation.13 6
Moreover, the Centerior decision may also be greatly diminished
by the possibility of a Supreme Court ruling interpreting CERCLA
as amended by SARA. 137 A Supreme Court decision that comports
with its earlier decision in Key Tronic and contains an explicit rule - a
potentially responsible party may continue to seek a cost recovery
claim under section 107 - would overrule the majority of appellate
courts holding otherwise, rendering Centerior contrary to federal
law.
Stephanie DiVittore
tion against those treated as joint tortfeasors") (quoting Key Tronic, 511 U.S. at 818
n. 11).
133. For a list of courts supporting the Sixth Circuit, see supra note 13 and
accompanying text.
134. See Centerior, 153 F.3d at 352 (leaving open question of whether innocent
parties or volunteer PRPs may pursue section 107 joint and several recovery). For
a discussion of CERCLA policy, see supra notes 2, 4 & 6 and accompanying text.
135. See Centerior, 153 F.3d at 355. The Sixth Circuit spent significant effort to
distinguish the Centerior facts from those of Velsicol in order to avoid overruling its
earlier decision. See id. For a detailed analysis of the Sixth Circuit's efforts, see
supra notes 119 & 125-27 and accompanying text.
136. For the facts, holding and rationale of the Sixth Circuit's seemingly con-
trary opinions, see supra notes 21-31 & 90-91 and accompanying text.
137. For the legislative history and rationale of CERCLA as amended by
SARA, see supra notes 4 & 6 and accompanying text.
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